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Abstract 
This paper considers the potential for securitizing index-based insurance products that transfer 
weather and natural disaster risks from lower income countries. The paper begins with a brief 
overview of why markets for natural disaster risks are important in lower income countries 
and a review of some recent activities using index-based weather insurance. Next, the paper 
explains how natural disaster risks are handled in higher income countries. These examples 
along with the example of an innovative index-based livestock insurance pilot project in 
Mongolia illustrate how layers, or tranches, of natural disaster risk can be financed during the 
product development phase by creating structures similar to the Special Purpose Vehicles 
used in catastrophe bond, mortgage bond, and the emerging microfinance bond markets. We 
refer to these investment alternatives as micro-CAT bonds since the principal amounts would 
be small relative to the existing CAT bond market. 
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CREATING INSURANCE MARKETS FOR NATURAL DISASTER RISK IN  
LOWER INCOME COUNTRIES: THE POTENTIAL ROLE FOR SECURITIZATION 
Jerry R. Skees, Barry J. Barnett, and Anne G. Murphy 
Many lower income countries (LICs) are highly exposed to losses caused by extreme weather 
events and other natural disasters, yet, insurance markets for transferring these risks are often 
missing in LICs. It is a working premise of this paper that a lack of domestic capital and 
limited access to global financial markets restrict opportunities for the ex ante transfer of 
natural disaster risks in many LICs.
2 This paper explores some new approaches to creating 
insurance markets for natural disaster risk in LICs. The increased use of index-based risk 
transfer products (IBRTPs) opens the way for these new approaches. 
Several authors have addressed the challenges associated with managing catastrophic risk in 
small LICs (ANDERSEN, 2002; HOFMAN and BRUKOFF, 2006; GURENKO and MAHUL, 2003). 
ANDERSEN (2002) describes the vulnerability of LICs to natural disasters and the role of 
donors in facilitating access to global markets for transferring risk while also building risk 
management capacity at the local level. HOFMAN and BRUKOFF (2006) review a number of 
public- and private-sector mechanisms that could be used to transfer natural disaster risk, as 
well as the challenges to the widespread adoption of these mechanisms in LICs. GURENKO 
and MAHUL (2003) review the problems with ex post disaster assistance and discuss how 
catastrophe insurance pools, catastrophe bonds (CAT bonds), and contingent loans can be 
used to provide LICs with more efficient and effective ex ante financing for disaster relief.  
This paper extends the literature on financing natural disaster risks in LICs by presenting 
conceptual arrangements that use the basic workings of CAT bonds with a unique structure 
for prefinancing natural disaster risk. Building on the financing structure of the Mongolian 
Index-based Livestock Insurance (IBLI) pilot, the paper considers the potential for marketing 
layers, or tranches, of risk to investors — especially during the early stages when the market 
for transferring risk outside the country is under development. As natural disaster risk transfer 
markets mature, a wider range of options for financing disaster risk should become more 
feasible; in particular traditional reinsurers are likely to become more involved. Options for 
financing natural disaster risks in LICs could eventually include a blend of global reinsurance 
and securitized risks as is occurring in higher income countries. 
1  Natural Disaster Risk Transfer and Economic Development in LICs 
By providing opportunities to transfer natural disaster risks out of the local economy, 
insurance markets can directly spur increased investment by agricultural producers in LICs in 
riskier but highly productive activities. Emerging evidence suggests that LICs with both 
banking and insurance markets experience the greatest economic growth (USAID, 2006). 
Insurance markets can also indirectly stimulate increased investment through linkages to 
credit markets. Lenders often ration credit in areas that are exposed to spatially correlated 
natural disaster risks since a widespread natural disaster can simultaneously cause a large 
number of loan defaults. However, lenders should be more willing to provide loans if 
borrowers can insure against natural disaster losses. For these reasons, markets for 
                                                 
2 To the extent that global reinsurers are willing to participate in experimental programs and provide reinsurance 
for small volumes of business, this premise may not be correct. Regardless, the purpose of this paper is not to 
debate that topic. Rather the major objective is to consider alternative mechanisms for financing experimental 
natural disaster risk transfer products in LICs.    2
transferring natural disaster risk are important for reducing vulnerability to risk and 
stimulating economic growth in many LICs.  
LICs are disproportionately affected by extreme weather events and other natural disasters. 
Losses caused by natural disasters, when measured as a percentage of gross national income, 
are highly negatively correlated with per capita income (LINNEROOTH-BAYER, MECHLER, and 
PFLUG, 2005). A single natural disaster can stunt economic growth for many years due to lost 
production, damaged infrastructure, and the diversion of scarce development resources for 
recovery efforts (CARTER ET AL., 2007). An example is Hurricane Mitch, which struck 
Honduras in 1998. Four years after the hurricane, the annual GDP in Honduras was still 6 
percent less than pre-disaster projections (LINNEROOTH-BAYER, MECHLER, and PFLUG, 2005). 
LICs are relatively more susceptible to natural disaster losses in part because their economies 
are more dependent on agriculture. In LICs, agricultural production accounts on average for 
almost 23 percent of GDP (WORLD  RESOURCES  INSTITUTE, 2007). This figure does not 
include the additional GDP generated by industries that provide agricultural inputs or that 
transport or process agricultural commodities. Employment in the agricultural sector in LICs 
is almost two times the GDP contributions. This dependence on agricultural production makes 
LICs more susceptible to economic losses caused by extreme weather events and other natural 
disasters. 
Extreme weather events and other natural disasters can have devastating effects on private-
sector businesses and local governments. Natural disasters destroy both private and public 
infrastructure. Private entities can experience long periods of business interruption, while 
local governments are forced to divert scarce resources from long-term investment priorities, 
such as education or health, to short-run disaster recovery needs.  
At the household level, natural disaster risk also contributes to chronic poverty. 
Approximately 1 billion people live on less than US$1 per day. Three-quarters of these 
“poorest of the poor” live in rural areas of LICs (CHEN and RAVALLION, 2007) and over one-
half depend on agriculture or agricultural labor as their primary livelihood strategy 
(INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT, 2001). Extreme weather events 
and other natural disasters can destroy productive household assets that have been 
accumulated at high opportunity cost (CARTER ET AL., 2007; CARTER and BARRETT, 2006; 
MCPEAK and BARRETT, 2001; DERCON, 1998). Recognizing the potential for such losses, 
households are prone to choose livelihood strategies that reduce risk exposure but likely also 
generate lower expected returns (CARTER and BARRETT, 2006; DERCON, 2005; ROSENZWEIG 
and BINSWANGER, 1993). 
By reducing exposure and vulnerability to natural disaster risks at all levels, the availability of 
risk transfer markets can create a more stable and attractive environment for investment. 
Using financial markets to prefinance natural disaster risk can create more stability in an 
economy following a natural disaster by reducing the government’s fiscal burden and 
providing a guaranteed source of relief funds. Likewise, the ability of rural businesses and 
agricultural intermediaries to protect themselves against economic shocks from natural 
disaster risks supports the sustainability and growth of the rural economy and should 
encourage greater investment in the rural sector. Finally, access to insurance or other means 
of transferring disaster risk can encourage households to invest in higher-return activities by 
reducing their exposure to natural disaster risk, thereby improving their access to credit.  
2  Missing Insurance Markets for Natural Disaster Risks in LICs 
While markets for transferring weather and natural disaster risks are important for economic 
development in LICs, these markets are often underdeveloped or missing due to asymmetric 
information, high transaction costs, and exposure to spatially correlated losses (SKEES and 
BARNETT, 2006). Also, governments in most LICs are unable to provide subsidies for these   3
markets as is done in many higher income countries (HESS ET AL., 2005). While difficulties 
with weather insurance markets (e.g., crop insurance) exist to some degree in any setting, they 
can be insurmountable when attempting to provide insurance to poor households in LICs 
(BARNETT, BARRETT, and SKEES, 2006). 
Asymmetric information problems are inherent to various types of insurance products. 
Careful underwriting of risk exposure and monitoring of policyholder behavior are necessary 
to address asymmetric information problems. However, there is a large fixed-cost component 
to underwriting and monitoring activities so, for small insurance policies, underwriting and 
monitoring costs are extremely large relative to the insured value. Similarly, there is a large 
fixed-cost component to the transaction costs of selling insurance policies and adjusting any 
claims. For small insurance policies, these costs are also large relative to the insured value. 
Because natural disaster losses tend to be spatially correlated, insurers cannot effectively pool 
these losses within the region or often times, even within the country. Thus, insurers are 
reluctant to offer coverage against natural disaster losses unless they can obtain reinsurance to 
transfer these spatially correlated losses into international markets. However, due to extreme 
uncertainty about the probability of occurrence, reinsurers will sometimes refuse to cover 
catastrophic loss exposure due to natural disasters. Even if reinsurance is offered, premium 
rates will be loaded to account for the extreme uncertainty. Reinsurers will also conduct due 
diligence on the insurer’s book of business. All of these costs must eventually be passed on to 
policyholders. The result is that insurance against correlated natural disaster losses is often 
either unavailable or unaffordable in LICs. 
3  Markets for Natural Disaster Risk in High and Middle Income Countries 
Even in higher income countries, financing correlated losses is a major challenge for any form 
of insurance that covers losses caused by extreme weather events and other natural disasters. 
Correlated risks result in large numbers of claims at the same time in the same geographic 
area. This means that if a major loss event occurs in the early years of establishing any form 
of indemnity fund or reserves, premiums may not be adequate to cover losses. Indemnities for 
a single event can exceed premiums collected in a single year by several times. It requires 
careful planning to ensure that adequate capital is available when major loss events create 
claims that exceed premiums. These issues are critical to the financial viability of any 
insurance company offering insurance against adverse weather events.  
Reinsurance is the most common mechanism for transferring large risks from primary 
insurers to international markets. While reinsurance is a very effective means of transferring 
risk, it does have some limitations. The reinsurance market is thin and there is limited price 
transparency. Also, there are significant transaction costs to reinsurance. Each reinsurance 
contract is customized, requiring costly legal fees. Conducting due diligence on the primary 
insurer’s book of business is costly. Finally, after the reinsurance contract is in place, the 
reinsurer must engage in costly monitoring to reduce moral hazard.  
In the case of catastrophic weather risks, an “ambiguity” load is often added to reinsurance 
premiums. In this context, ambiguity refers to the tremendous uncertainty that exists about the 
likelihood and magnitude of extreme weather events. To be cautious, reinsurers load premium 
rates to account for this ambiguity. Reinsurance pricing is also very volatile. Following a 
major loss event, premiums tend to rise dramatically in the affected markets. Over time, 
premiums gradually fall until the next big loss event. For example, following very active 
hurricane seasons in 2004 and 2005, reinsurance prices increased dramatically for 2006 in 
U.S. and Mexican markets. Compared to 2005, reinsurance prices increased 76 percent in the 
United States, and 129 percent in Mexico, while reinsurance prices in other parts of the world 
rose only 2 percent (GUY CARPENTER, 2007).   4
A number of scholars have also expressed concern that the lack of understanding of the risks 
and events being insured may result in relatively high prices (CAMERER and KUNREUTHER, 
1989; HOGARTH and KUNREUTHER, 1989). FROOT (1999) provides more in-depth analysis of 
this issue for catastrophe reinsurance with a list of explanations for this phenomenon: 1) the 
market power of reinsurers; 2) high moral hazard and adverse selection problems at the 
insurance level; and 3) inefficient corporate structure within the reinsurance industry.  
As a response to volatile reinsurance markets, CAT bonds emerged in the mid- to late 1990s 
as an alternative means to transfer catastrophic risk. These risk-linked securities transfer 
specific types of catastrophic risk from the holder to the investor.  
Scholars have described the evolution of this new form of risk financing as the convergence 
of reinsurance and capital markets (COLE and CHIARENZA, 1999; DOHERTY, 1997; LAMM, 
1997). CAT bonds involve the creation of a marketable security that is tied to a specific 
catastrophic event and is financed by premiums flowing from contingent claims transactions 
— generally traditional insurance or reinsurance transactions. If the catastrophic event does 
not occur, the investor receives a rate of return that is generally a few hundred basis points 
higher than the LIBOR.
3 If the catastrophic event does occur, the investor loses the interest 
and some predefined portion (up to 100 percent) of the principal invested. The funds are then 
used by the seller of the CAT bond to pay claims to policyholders. 
Since the volume of capital markets is many times that of the entire reinsurance industry, 
access to capital markets could compensate for some of the limitations of traditional 
reinsurance. For example, in 2005 the U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO) reported 
that insurers were beginning to believe that “the presence of catastrophe bonds as an 
alternative means of transferring risk may have moderated reinsurance premium increases 
over the years.” (GAO, 2005: 27) 
A defining characteristic of CAT bonds is that the occurrence of a prespecified catastrophic 
event will cause the investor to lose some, or all, of the principal. However, CAT bonds differ 
based on how the catastrophic event is measured. Indemnity-triggered CAT bonds measure 
the occurrence of the catastrophic event based on losses actually incurred by the seller. A 
limitation of indemnity-triggered CAT bonds is that, as with reinsurance, the purchaser will 
insist on conducting due diligence on the sellers’ book of business. This adds transaction costs 
and also requires the seller to disclose potentially proprietary underwriting information. Also, 
due to the potential for moral hazard, the purchaser will also have to monitor the activities of 
the seller — adding further transaction costs. 
In recent years, the use of indemnity-based triggers has declined relative to contracts that 
utilize various index-based triggers. Index-based CAT bonds do not define the triggering 
catastrophic event based on losses incurred by the seller but rather, based on some objective 
measure that is highly correlated with losses incurred. An example is parametric triggered 
CAT bonds that trigger principal forfeitures based on physical parameters such as weather 
variables (TURVEY  and  CHANTARAT, 2006). Modeled loss-triggered CAT bonds trigger 
principal forfeitures based on loss predictions from a statistical model that incorporates one or 
more physical parameters (e.g., weather variables). Industry loss-triggered CAT bonds trigger 
principal forfeitures based on the average loss experience for an industry in a region rather 
than losses experienced only by the seller of the bond. Another example is hybrid-triggered 
CAT bonds, which require more than one underlying index to trigger before the principal is 
forfeited. 
Index-based CAT bonds are simply a specific form of a more general class of financial 
instruments we refer to as index-based risk transfer products (IBRTP). Other examples of 
                                                 
3   London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is a daily reference rate based on the interest rates at which banks 
offer to lend unsecured funds to other banks in the London wholesale or “interbank” money market.   5
IBRTPs include products such as weather derivatives, weather index insurance, and area-yield 
insurance. As with other IBRTPs, index-based CAT bonds have the advantage of much lower 
transaction costs relative to traditional reinsurance or indemnity-triggered CAT bonds. The 
use of index-based CAT bonds also reduces moral hazard which may be of particular 
importance in areas where regulatory oversight and monitoring of the insurance sector is less 
developed. CAT bonds that use direct parametric measures (referred to as indexes in this 
paper) comprised about 30 percent of CAT bond risk capital in 2006. Hybrid products that use 
some form of indexing comprised another 37 percent in 2006 (GUY CARPENTER, 2007).  
Indemnity-triggered or index-based CAT bonds can be sold for different layers (or tranches) 
of risk, much like reinsurance. For example, to protect against flood losses in a given region, 
an insurer may sell parametric triggered CAT bonds based on aggregate rainfall over a period 
of time measured at a specified weather station. By selling CAT bonds with different trigger 
levels of aggregate rainfall, the seller can match the proceeds from the CAT bonds with 
expected losses due to different levels of rainfall. 
The market for CAT bonds in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, has been 
growing since the first transactions in the mid-1990s. In 2006 the market nearly doubled from 
the previous year, with 20 issues worth nearly US$5 billion (figure 1). Following the record 
losses from Hurricane Katrina, reinsurance premiums increased dramatically in some markets, 
leading to greater interest in the use of CAT bonds to transfer hurricane risk. This increased 
demand led to higher yields on CAT bonds which, in turn, generated more interest from 
investors. Standardization and experience with these instruments have also contributed to the 
growth of this market as investors become more familiar and comfortable with CAT bonds. 
Importantly, reinsurance companies are also using CAT bond markets to reduce some of their 
extreme exposure.  














































Source: Authors’ representation based on GUY CARPENTER, 2007, page 5 
In 2006 Mexico became the first middle income country to issue CAT bonds to provide 
disaster financing in the event of a high magnitude earthquake. The bonds were underwritten 
by SwissRe and issued by CAT-Mex, Ltd. The CAT bonds provide US$160 million in 
contingent disaster financing for the most catastrophic layer of risk: earthquakes of 8.0 or 
greater on the Richter scale that occur in a defined zone in Mexico. An index insurance 
contract provides up to an additional US$290 million for earthquakes of the same magnitude   6
occurring in either of two other zones. Under the structure of this bond, if an earthquake of 
this magnitude occurs, investors lose their entire principal, which is transferred to the 
government for disaster relief. At issue, the bonds were offered at 235 basis points above 
LIBOR. The Mexican government paid US$26 million to secure this financing arrangement 
(CARDENAS, 2006; MALKIN, 2006). These CAT bonds were structured to complement a 
World Bank loan of up to US$180 million that is triggered by earthquakes of magnitude 7.0 
or greater on the Richter scale. By layering these catastrophic risks and transferring them into 
international markets, Mexico can maintain a smaller disaster reserve fund, allowing more of 
the country’s limited financial resources to be invested in health, education, infrastructure, 
and other public needs. 
While there will always be an important role for reinsurance in transferring the risk of 
extreme weather events and other natural disasters, CAT bond markets are evolving into a 
cost-effective and efficient means of transferring catastrophic risks. Since the average CAT 
bond term is 3 years, the price and terms of the contract are stable for multiple years. 
Additionally, there is little credit risk. Just as is done when securitizing credit risks, funds are 
secured in a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) so payment upon a triggering event is assured. 
CAT bonds do have important limitations. There are significant transaction costs to 
establishing CAT bonds. These costs include risk analysis, product design, legal fees, and the 
establishment of SPVs. They also include the special regulatory considerations that are 
needed to protect investors. Regulatory burdens can increase when attempting to protect 
individual investors as opposed to institutional investors.  
4  Emergence of Risk Transfer Markets for Natural Disaster Risk in LICs 
In recent years, a number of promising approaches have emerged to assist LICs in transferring 
natural disaster risk. Most of these have required significant support from donors to pay for 
the large upfront costs of developing these markets in countries that have previously had little 
access to risk-transfer for natural disasters. Largely due to World Bank efforts, index-based 
rainfall insurance in India has been expanding since its introduction in 2003. These policies 
are sold to small farm households by both private-sector insurance companies and the 
parastatal insurance company — the Agricultural Insurance Company of India. In Malawi, the 
World Bank has also been involved in introducing index-based drought insurance that is tied 
to both lending and the sale of seed. A number of other World Bank pilot projects are in 
development to expand the use and applications of index-based insurance for weather risks in 
LICs (HESS ET AL., 2005). 
One of the most recent examples of a much larger index-based insurance project is the World 
Bank facilitated Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF). The CCRIF is 
designed to provide Caribbean countries with ready liquidity in the event of a hurricane or 
earthquake (WORLD BANK, 2007). Parametric triggers are used to make timely payments in 
each individual country using information from a third party such as the U.S. Geological 
Survey or the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Donor funds 
are paying for much of the development costs of this risk-pooling facility. Each country pays 
a premium rate that is consistent with the underlying parametric risk for the country. 
Furthermore, each country can select the sum insured. Payments will be made based on the 
country’s choice of parametric measures, trigger levels, and sum insured. The countries 
involved in the CCRIF are pooling their risk exposure to reduce the variability in losses. The 
CCRIF is to be reinsured by a major reinsurer. By pooling their loss exposure, the member 
countries can reduce the premium cost of reinsurance. Structures such as the CCRIF allow 
smaller countries to pool their risks and obtain sufficient scale so that other approaches to risk 
financing become feasible, including the potential to securitize some of the risks using 
instruments such as CAT bonds.   7
5  Extending the Mongolian IPLI Project to Securitize Weather Risk in LICs  
While the details for the CCRIF structure are being settled as this paper is written, it is useful 
to turn to the case of Mongolia to highlight key ideas. The CCRIF could offer similar 
opportunities to what are being presented here using the Mongolia project. Livestock in 
Mongolia are highly vulnerable to extreme weather events, locally known as dzud. Dzud is a 
series of compounded weather events that create poor conditions for grazing livestock. For 
example, in 2001 a major dzud (summer drought followed by a harsh winter) led to 
widespread livestock losses. Mongolia lost nearly one-third of all cattle and yak. Specific 
areas of the country experienced even higher livestock losses in 2001 and 2002. 
The government of Mongolia entered into a loan agreement with the World Bank as a means 
of financing a tranche of extreme risk in a pilot project for index-based livestock insurance 
(IBLI). The IBLI policy is sold to individual herders but payments are based on an aggregate 
index of livestock mortality at the soum (county) level. IBLI is being pilot-tested in three 
different aimags (provinces/states). The Base Insurance Product (BIP) pays an indemnity 
anytime mortality in the soum exceeds either 6 or 10 percent (depending on the policyholder’s 
choice). Payments from the BIP reach a maximum when the soum livestock mortality rate 
exceeds a prespecified level (25 percent in one aimag and 30 percent in the other two aimags). 
For herders purchasing the BIP, the government provides an additional benefit to pay for all 
loses beyond those covered by the BIP. This is done to clearly separate the government social 
role from the market-based BIP product. 
Since the same underlying parametric index (aggregate livestock mortality) is used for the 
BIP in each soum, it was possible to create a unique pooling arrangement for the participating 
insurance companies. Given that each insurance company is selling the same index insurance 
policy (though perhaps in different soums), they are willing to participate in a collective pool 
of these policies without needing to perform due diligence on each other’s book of business. It 
is also useful to recognize that every insurance company is selling a uniform product at the 
same premium rate for the risk portion of the premium and that the actuarial development was 
performed by an independent third party. The pool, known as the Livestock Insurance 
Indemnity Pool (LIIP), is funded from two sources. Each year, before any BIP policies are 
sold, every participating insurance company seeds the LIIP with a capital infusion that is 
approximately 40 percent of their expected BIP premiums for that year. This capital infusion 
is known as the Guaranteed Indemnity Contribution (GIC). The second source of funds is that 
participating insurance companies deposit the premiums received (minus their administrative 
load) from the sale of BIP policies into the LIIP. Insurance companies are allowed to place 
their own administrative load on the premiums charged to herders. The administrative load 
part of the collected premiums is directly transferred to the insurance companies. 
Given the experimental nature of the project, it was not practical to secure reinsurance. Thus, 
the Mongolian government is providing reinsurance on the LIIP at favorable terms. Herder 
premium rates were developed using 33 years of historic mortality data and standard actuarial 
procedures to risk-load for the catastrophic risk represented in these data. In 2006 and 2007 
the government stop loss was set at 105 percent of the total contributions to the LIIP. On 
average, approximately 35 percent of the premiums deposited in the LIIP is used to build a 
reinsurance reserve, however the percentage varies by company depending on the riskiness of 
their book of BIP policies. The reserve can build value over time (i.e., any unused funds will 
remain in the reinsurance reserve from one year to the next). This is important, as it affords 
the opportunity to create a more sustainable insurance program. Finally, if the BIP reserve is 
exhausted in any given year, the World Bank contingent loan is called to pay all remaining 
losses. 
After the reinsurance contribution is made, the remaining funds in the LIIP (105 percent of 
herder premiums) earn interest over the entire insurance cycle. Even in a catastrophic year   8
when all of the funds in the LIIP are needed to pay herder indemnities, insurance companies 
will recover the interest earnings. Each insurance company owns a share of underwriting 
gains in the LIIP that is equal to their portion of premium sales. Insurance companies are 
provided software to evaluate their risk-return profile given their book of business (i.e., their 
premium volume by soum and species) and their capital-at-risk, which is equal to the prepaid 
indemnity contributions. While the pilot has organized the LIIP account to be closed out at the 
end of each insurance cycle, more complex structures are more desirable to impose a proper 
discipline for reserving.  
The structure of the IBLI financing is presented in figure 2. There are three distinct tranches 
within this structure: Tranche 1 — the LIIP which is a prepaid indemnity pool similar in 
structure to an SPV; Tranche 2 — a reinsurance tranche or layer that pays for losses that 
exceed the funds available in the LIIP (105 percent of herder paid premiums) up to the point 
where the BIP reinsurance reserve funds are exhausted (alternatively, the upper bound could 
be explicitly established); and Tranche 3 — a catastrophe reinsurance reserve (currently 
financed by the World Bank contingent loan) for losses beyond those which can be paid under 
Tranche 1 and 2. At the current time for the Mongolian project, Tranche 1 is the commercial 
tranche. However, depending on how the herder premium is distributed, any combination of 
the tranches could be made commercial (Tranche 1 only; Tranche 1 and 2 only; or Tranche 1, 
2, and 3).  
Figure 2:  Financing Structure of the Index-based Livestock Insurance in Mongolia 
 
Source: Authors’ representation 
The structure can be replicated for any index-based insurance product. For example, if a 
country offers drought insurance using local weather stations or even satellite data with 
models to estimate soil moisture, these index-based contracts could be organized with a 
structure similar to that presented for Mongolia. This structure is more rigid than many other 
forms of regulation as it both ring-fences this unique line of insurance from other areas of the 




































Net GIC  9
not left unprotected if an insurance company fails and cannot pay indemnity obligations.
4 Of 
more interest for this paper, this structure develops clear rules for paying losses and clearly 
defines the financing for each tranche. In principle, each of these tranches could be 
securitized. Given the data and the portfolio model, a risk-rating entity could provide an initial 
rating for each tranche. At the outset, one could also provide market-based pricing for these 
debt instruments.  
Each of the insurance companies own a share of Tranche 1 (the LIIP) based on their share of 
premium collected from herders. The LIIP can be thought of as an SPV (much like those used 
for CAT bonds or the securitization of loan portfolios) albeit organized and controlled by the 
government. The commitment of the government of Mongolia and the World Bank loan 
imposes significant discipline on the management of the LIIP account. Given the structure of 
this unique SPV, it would be very straightforward to allow an insurance company to sell any 
portion of their LIIP share at any time, from the point of BIP sales to the settlement of 
payments. Of course, the value would be significantly driven down in a year of massive dzud. 
There is no good reason to require the insurance company to continue to hold their share of 
the LIIP through the complete insurance cycle. This flexibility could easily allow the 
insurance company to remove their capital at any time. An insurance company could decide 
after the sales season that they have too much capital at risk in the LIIP or they could be in a 
position where they would like to liquidate part of their LIIP investment to use in alternative 
investments. 
Given the experimental nature of the pilot, the Mongolian government and the World Bank 
currently hold the risk for Tranches 2 and 3. However, should the pilot prove successful (and 
with some minor modifications that clearly define the boundaries of each tranche), Tranches 2 
and 3 could also be financed in the private sector through reinsurance or securitized 
instruments like CAT bonds. Given sufficient historic data and portfolio models that evaluate 
the spatial distribution of sales against the historic losses, one can estimate the risk profile for 
any one of the three tranches presented in figure 1. As updated information regarding 
potential losses from the underlying index becomes available, the risk-return profile for each 
tranche could be dynamically recalculated, allowing for continuous trading of securities based 
on each tranche. 
6  Marketing Tranches of Risks for Natural Disaster Risks in LICs 
The structure presented in figure 2 opens the way for micro-CAT bonds
5 that could also be 
used to transfer correlated, catastrophic risks out of LICs and into global capital markets. If 
such instruments can be established, this should help stimulate more risk transfer 
opportunities (e.g., insurance markets) within the country. For LICs, micro-CAT bonds could 
offer some important advantages relative to traditional reinsurance. Of course, the issue of 
who will pay the transaction costs of establishing and reviewing the type of structure that is 
presented in figure 2 is a paramount consideration. Donors and LIC governments will likely 
have to incur these costs. 
In considering a structure of the type presented in figure 2, an important question is how to 
market this type of risk. As the scale of use and the comfort with this type of structure 
increases, one can expect global reinsurance markets to become involved. This section 
describes how individual and institutional investors could also become financially involved in 
                                                 
4 The reader should bear in mind that this aspect of the project to protect the herders is unique. This may not be 
the best policy if one considers other individuals who have different types of insurance from the same company. 
They may need an equal claim to assets in the event that the insurance company becomes insolvent.  
5 We use the term “micro-CAT bond” because investing is of such small volume that it may not be of interest to 
either the CAT bond market or to a global reinsurer. One should also recognize that the level of risk in Tranche 1 
is actually not catastrophic.    10
experimental projects that develop natural disaster risk transfer markets in LICs. These 
investments offer the opportunity to support the emergence of insurance markets for natural 
disaster risks in LICs by easing a common constraint to market development — access to 
capital. This involvement could be structured with an institutional investor or it could be more 
direct as described below. The challenge of attracting institutional investors remains the high 
transaction costs associated with the due diligence on structuring and rating the tranches to 
determine an appropriate return. More intriguing is the open question of how to involve the 
individual investor. However, regulation to protect individual investors may also be an 
insurmountable burden.  
In any case, any one of the three tranches presented in figure 2 of this paper offers the 
opportunity for investing in an instrument similar to a securitized loan portfolio or a CAT 
bond. The challenge is how would any of the micro-CAT bonds be marketed and how would 
one have some assurance that the proper structure is in place to package IBRTPs for natural 
disasters? Donors have demonstrated a willingness to incur the costs of developing pilot 
programs for the transfer of weather and natural disaster risks in LICs. Without such donor 
support, very little of the activity to date would have occurred. Public good arguments can be 
used to justify public or donor support targeted at facilitating the development of new natural 
disaster risk transfer markets for LICs. To that end, the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) of the World Bank Group has been working to become a share owner in a Global Index 
Reinsurance Facility (GIRIF). The GIRIF would consist of:  
1.  “a commercial risk-taking company to underwrite indexable weather and other 
indexable natural catastrophe risks in developing countries, and  
2.  a technical assistance/donor funding pool to develop the technical parameters of the 
business.”
6 
Given the use of reliable index-based contracts that are more likely to be free of moral hazard 
and adverse selection, these market developments may also attract more investors from the 
outside. It will be necessary for these markets to develop some level of scale before global 
reinsurance markets will be willing to fully participate. It is also extremely important that the 
regulatory environment is strong, to increase confidence both inside and outside the LIC 
about the sustainability of the emerging insurance markets for natural disaster risks. The 
financing structure for the IBLI presents one example for how to create an SPV-like structure 
that is needed to gain the confidence of outside investors.  
Returning to how one might finance the LIIP account (Tranche 1) in the Mongolian project, it 
would be quite feasible to organize the sale of shares that are currently held by insurance 
companies. Consider simply organizing 100 certificates, each representing a 1 percent share 
of the proceeds from this SPV. It should be possible to allow anyone to purchase any of these 
shares at any point in time. Of course, there is no reason to restrict the ownership of shares to 
a fixed percentage (i.e., 1 percent); any fraction would be easy to implement. It would be 
important to track the total volume to make certain that a clearly defined business entity or 
individual owns every portion of the SPV. Owners could include other investors in Mongolia, 
global reinsurers, or a broader global community of investors. Again, the shares could 
conceivably be sold at any time during the insurance cycle. The price would change based on 
the expectations regarding mortality in different regions of Mongolia. A more practical 
application would be a shorter period of sales that coincides with the sales closing period. 
                                                 
6   This information was taken from the IFC website on May 30, 2007 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/spiwebsite1.nsf/2bc34f011b50ff6e85256a550073ff1c/0c3e26c0a76328ec85257235
005bad08?opendocument   11
7  Institutional and Socially Responsible Investors 
There are obvious questions and challenges to the ideas presented in this paper. As was 
pointed out above, in the Mongolian case only Tranche 1 is commercial at this stage. Thus, 
any investors may be attracted to Tranche 1, which offers the potential for a positive return. 
Tranche 2 will grow into a more commercial venture if reserves are built over time and if 
there is imposed an upper limit to when payments from this tranche stop and payments from 
Tranche 3 begin. For those tranches that are not commercial, one can raise the question 
regarding how socially responsible investors might be willing to become involved. Maybe 
some groups or individuals would be willing to invest in social tranches knowing that they 
would have the risk of losses with a rate of return lower than market rates, simply in the name 
of helping develop these markets. Another challenge is to ensure that the opportunity for 
investing in any of these tranches is made with the lowest transaction costs possible.  
It is useful to review some of the progress made on other fronts to provide context for these 
ideas. Socially responsible investing that supports social, environmental, and corporate 
responsibility shows a growing interest, and in recent years new investment instruments have 
emerged, allowing investors to support the poor in LICs while still making a return. For 
example, the Calvert Group, Ltd (www.calvert.com) offers socially responsible mutual funds 
made up of companies that have been selected according to various social criteria. Calvert 
also offers other unique on-line arrangements that direct socially responsible investors to 
community-based investments in development (http://www.calvertgiving.org/).  
The securitization of microfinance portfolios also provides a venue for socially responsible 
investors to diversify their investment portfolio while also supporting development in LICs. 
There is a growing demand for capital in the microfinance markets of the world. Some argue 
that the demand is significantly greater than the supply. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) have 
learned that using capital markets rather than relying on donor grants and loans can be a more 
flexible and sustainable source of capital. For example, Compartamos is one of the largest 
MFIs in Mexico. Compartamos first securitized a portion of their portfolio in local currency 
in 2002. That endeavor was well received by both individual and institutional investors and 
allowed the MFI to greatly expand their lending operations. In 2004 they issued a second 
bond (US$44 million) for institutional investors to further expand their capital and lending 
capability. The transactions were underwritten by Banamex, a Mexican subsidiary of 
Citigroup. There are also a growing number of MFI investment funds that comprise a pool of 
smaller MFIs. Blue Orchard Microfinance Securities issued the first cross-border 
microfinance securitization in 2004 with a US$40 million bond issued to benefit a pool of 
MFIs in nine countries (INSTITUTE FOR FINANCIAL  MANAGEMENT AND RESEARCH,  2007; 
MEEHAN, 2004). 
The largest securitization by an individual MFI took place in Bangladesh in 2006 with the 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC). BRAC has more than 5 million 
borrowers with an average loan size of US$162. BRAC has arranged to securitize US$180 
million of their loan portfolio over 6 years in local currency at a cost of 12 percent, which is 
about 2 percent lower than could be achieved by borrowing that amount through commercial 
banks (INSTITUTE FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND RESEARCH, 2007) 
A significant example to the ideas presented in this paper is the use of the Internet to attract 
individual investors. Kiva organizes peer-to-peer lending between socially responsible 
investors in higher income countries and individual entrepreneurs in LICs through Web-based 
transactions. While there are important distinctions between this and what is being proposed 
in this paper, Kiva is a noteworthy development. Kiva began in March, 2005, and since then 
more than 60,000 people have lent over US$6 million to small businesses and entrepreneurs 
in LICs (http://www.kiva.org/). The growth of Kiva speaks to the willingness of people to   12
make investments even without a financial gain since Kiva lenders receive no return on their 
loans and there is the risk of default (although repayment rates thus far are excellent).  
In summary, the growing number of microfinance investment funds and securitizations as 
well as the activity that is emerging on the Internet, like Kiva, the Grameen Foundation 
(http://www.grameenfoundation.org), and some of the activity managed by Calvert 
(http://www.calvert.com), speak to the potential market for social investing in natural 
disasters given the right platform, infrastructure, credibility, and marketing.  
Returning to the Mongolian structure presented in figure 2, each of the three tranches 
represents a form of an SPV, albeit that Tranche 1 is the only commercial tranche at this 
point. To the extent that the control of each tranche is placed in a stronger legal and regulatory 
framework, such as under the control of the state bank of the LIC, this may increase the 
confidence of investors. The CAT bond element that may be missing in the short term is the 
necessary rating by a financial rating institution. Portfolio software developed by a third party 
can provide indicative pricing; still, it would require some faith on the part of the socially 
responsible investors that the project and the structure are sound. Evidence from the 
investment activity presented above gives some indication that socially responsible investors 
are willing to use their money based upon a large degree of faith. Thus, one can consider that 
the tranches presented in figure 2 could be sold as micro-CAT bonds marketed to either 
institutional or individual investors. Again, each of these tranches can be developed with 
more or less commercial versus social objectives. To the extent they are clearly commercial, 
they could attract both reinsurers and institutional investors.  
As Kiva, Grameen Foundation, and Calvert have demonstrated, the proper presentation can 
attract socially responsible investors. To the extent that socially responsible investors gain 
confidence that the investments satisfy their desire to contribute to development in LICs and, 
in the case of the Calvert offerings, to diversify their investment portfolios, there could be a 
strong market for these activities. The individual integrity of projects that have strong 
accountability and transparency should be of the most interest to this class of investor. This 
feedback should also enhance the incentives for those working on these types of projects to 
ensure that they are developed in a sustainable fashion.  
As an extension of the ideas presented in this paper, securitization of natural disaster risks in 
LICs could also offer a different approach for people to give money for natural disaster relief. 
While the idea of providing disaster relief with these types of index-based weather insurance 
is also being tested (as in the Ethiopia World Food Program, and with the Mexican FONDEN 
program), it is useful to consider how individuals may be willing to “lend” money via 
structures similar to those presented in this paper. Many concerned citizens provide 
contributions after natural disasters occur in LICs. These post hoc responses, while well-
intentioned, are provided without the benefit of ex ante rules and structure, increasing the 
likelihood of such funds being used inappropriately. These same individuals may be 
persuaded that their good intentions could also be served by investing in the early 
development phases of an insurance project that is targeted at transferring natural disaster 
risks from the poor. Such a project would have predefined rules about how funds are 
distributed after the disaster. These instruments must have clear rules regarding who will 
receive the benefits. The transparency of when and how funds would be used when a disaster 
strikes provides a strong incentive for those who are concerned about what happens to any 
charitable donations for disaster relief after a major event has occurred. Micro-CAT bonds 
that are linked to products that use a parametric index should be more attractive to a broader 
class of investors as these instruments are less prone to moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems. Additionally, many of the parametric indexes are likely to trigger payments more 
rapidly than many other systems designed to get cash after a disaster to those who lose crops, 
livestock, or assets (GOES AND SKEES, 2003).    13
8  Conclusion 
Progress has been made in the development and use of CAT bonds in higher income 
countries, which allow equity investors to prefinance the losses from major catastrophes. In 
the most extreme cases, money invested in a CAT bond will only be used to cover 
catastrophic losses, and investors forfeit their capital. If there is no catastrophe, investors 
receive the principle and a high rate of interest. Extending these ideas, this paper introduces 
the potential for micro-CAT bonds to prefinance losses from natural disasters in LICs. The 
increased activity using IBRTPs for natural disaster risks in LICs opens the way for this 
approach. Such index insurance is less prone to the traditional problems of adverse selection 
and moral hazard. To the extent that the transaction costs are lower, aggregate indexes for 
weather, earthquakes, and even hurricanes and typhoons could offer a feasible path to a new 
generation of micro-CAT bond products in LICs.  
This paper uses the structure of the Mongolian IBLI project to demonstrate how a pool of 
index insurance products could be carefully regulated while also developing the needed 
structure to introduce micro-CAT bonds. While CAT bonds have high transaction costs in 
setting up the SPVs and developing the rating as a means of determining the price, it is argued 
that micro-CAT bonds could be marketed to both institutional investors and a broad class of 
socially responsible investors under a project structure similar to that of the Mongolian IBLI 
project and using an internet platform similar to that used by Calvert, the Grameen 
Foundation, and Kiva.  
Finally, these ideas are presented to spur new thinking about how to facilitate insurance 
markets for natural disaster risks in LICs. The use of micro-CAT bonds is unlikely to provide 
large capacity as the market grows. That is not the intent. Rather the intent is to provide 
nascent insurance markets in LICs with access to capital. In LICs the lack of access to global 
reinsurers and capital markets is a constraint to insuring against natural disaster risk. Micro-
CAT bonds could crowd-in a capital market in such a fashion that the more developed and 
much larger reinsurance market would become significantly involved. Micro-CAT bonds 
provide the opportunity to get limited venture capital of a broad class of investors into well-
structured pilot tests that use index-based insurance to transfer extreme weather and natural 
disaster risk in LICs.    14
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